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The Climate Responsibility Norm Ensuring 
Meaningful Participation in a Budding 
International Norm 
 
Katie Lindsay*  
ABSTRACT  
States are shifting their focus from preventing climate change to 
lessening the potential harms and learning how to live within a harsher 
climate.  This paper focuses on why the international community needs to 
focus on its climate responsibility to abate these growing concerns.  
Focusing on the goal, not the form, would allow flexibility and for states to 
adapt to climate change within their governmental and cultural norms.  
Developing states should not dedicate resources to monitoring greenhouse 
gas emissions when their national goals barely make a dent compared to 
developed states’ total contributions.  Mayer argues that a climate 
assessment norm is on the horizon by expanding the international 
environmental assessment norm.  Here, I analyze Mayer’s analysis through 
case studies of the United States, Ethiopia, South Korea, and Fiji, arguing 
instead that, although a climate assessment norm may be budding, the 
world needs to form a climate responsibility norm that allows all states to 
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Governments need to significantly decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions to lessen the effects of climate change and protect both humans 
and the biodiversity that calls this planet home.  The necessary changes are 
substantial, requiring states to embrace adaption to our new environments 
and available technologies.  The international community must 
fundamentally shift from abusive GHG practices to renewable and 
sustainable ways of life to successfully maintain our planet.  Developed 
states need to alter their GHG production drastically. In contrast, 
developing states need to focus on adaption solutions and avoid the trap of 
GHG dependence to raise their standards of living.  The international 
community needs to push states to focus on the goal, not the form, and 
allow flexibility in adapting to climate change impacts within their 
governmental and cultural customs. 
The lack of success in mitigating international GHGs to sustainable 
levels illustrates why governments need to start preparing for the worst 
effects, particularly in less affluent developing nations.  Physically seeing 
the adaption measures necessary will conscript humans to lessen climate 
impacts and allow states to rebound more effectively from climate 
disasters.  A climate assessment would incentivize states to consider the 
GHG impacts of a developmental or governmental policy.  This climate 
assessment idea builds on other agreed-upon international norms, such 
as the norm against transboundary harm, intergenerational equity, and 
environmental assessments. Mayer takes these principles 
and international climate change agreements to argue for a budding climate 
assessment norm.1  Initially, the benefits of a climate assessment norm are 
appealing.  However, the struggles developing nations have faced with 
environmental impact assessments illustrates the need for a climate norm 
that fosters compliance within each nation’s different governance and 
cultural norms.  States that are not already successfully improving the 
environment through environmental assessments or lack meaningful public 
participation will not benefit from another empty action.  At the same time, 
developed states that institute climate assessments but not significant 
mitigations perpetuate another type of empty action under the climate 
assessment title.  These distinct challenges demonstrate why a climate 
assessment norm must sprout from the common but differentiated 
responsibilities norm because different states must prepare differently for 
the various impacts and goals that each state must meet.   
 
1.  Benoit Mayer, Climate Assessment as an Emerging Obligation Under 
Customary International Law, 68 BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND 






 This paper begins with Section I, discussing environmental 
assessments and Mayer’s idea of climate assessments as a budding 
international norm.  Section II describes the environmental assessments, 
climate assessments, and adaption case studies of the United States and 
California, Ethiopia, South Korea, and Fiji.  Section III argues for the need 
to embrace a climate responsibility norm instead of pushing western values 
onto states without adequately addressing the abatement of climate impacts.   
HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS AND 
THE BUDDING CLIMATE ASSESSMENT NORM 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT LEGAL HISTORY 
 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of the United States 
is considered the genesis of international environmental assessments.  This 
act required any federal government action to analyze the environmental 
impacts of the proposed action.2  After other states adopted this policy, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) solidified this as an international 
concept in the Pulp Mills decision.3  In Pulp Mills, Argentina argued 
Uruguay had not adequately notified Argentina before a project’s initial 
approval that could impact the shared river of Argentina and Uruguay.4  
Uruguay counter-claimed that it had met its burden because although 
the international norm required an EA, which Uruguay completed, it did 
not institute any required procedures.5  The Court disagreed and held that 
the practice had gained the required level of acceptance among the states to 
establish an international norm requiring the completion of an EA when 
there are risks of substantial environmental impacts to a shared resource.6   
 In Pulp Mills, the ICJ found that Uruguay had not fulfilled its due 
diligence, holding that the duty of vigilance and prevention required more 
than Uruguay had completed.7  This case illustrates that EAs are not only 
enforceable internationally but that each state must enforce its specific 
standards and due diligence to meet the EA requirement.8  Thus, the ICJ 
decision found that the EA norm had become an erga omnes.9 
 
2.  National Environmental Policy Act §102, 42 U.S.C. 4332(C) (1969).   
3.  Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgement 2010 
I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20). 
4.  Id. at ¶ 215.  
5.  Id. at ¶ 216.  
6.  Id. at ¶ 223. 
7.  Id. at ¶ 205; Mayer, supra note 1, at 303.  
8.  Pulp Mills, supra note 3, at 32, 34; see also Mayer, supra note 1, at 305.   






B. THE BEGINNINGS OF A CLIMATE ASSESSMENT NORM 
In understanding the international community’s EA norm, Mayer 
argues for a budding international climate assessment norm.10  A climate 
assessment (CA) is when an EA includes an estimate of the GHG emissions 
a development will expend and the impacts of such expenditure.11  Thus, 
CA allows decision-makers to fully picture a project’s environmental and 
climate change impacts, particularly the cumulative impacts of a project 
and whether the community should undertake such an action.  CA would 
thus pressure states and lower governments to meet GHG targets because 
they will have more concrete knowledge of their GHG contributions and 
increase mitigation requests.  After all, mitigations frequently go hand in 
hand with decision-makers and public knowledge of a project’s impacts.   
Mayer argues that CA is a budding international norm.  
First, numerous countries have started to study GHG impacts within their 
EAs, such as South Africa, Hong Kong, and the United States.12  Second, 
many states have a desire to meet their global reduction 
goals.13  Third, even without specific legal obligations, some states are 
enacting CA ideals: China has one example in its Ministry of 
Environmental Protection guide on environmental impact assessments.14  
The World Bank has also stated that estimates of GHG impacts are part of 
“good international industry practice.”15  Nevertheless, Mayer points out 
that not all states follow this practice.  Some states bar GHG estimates, and 
others allow GHG estimates inconsistently, which leaves the method 
incomplete overall yet potentially growing in international acceptance.16  
In comparison to state actions, international treaties only hint at the 
idea of a CA norm.  No climate change treaty or agreement requires CAs, 
and state sovereignty reigns high.  However, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states that 
nations should consider climate change impacts to the extent feasible, and 
the UN General Assembly recognized the need to integrate 
climate change measures into national policies.17  The Paris Accords 
agreed to pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim 
of achieving the objectives of the agreement.18  However, no state 
 
10.  Mayer, supra note 1, at 274. 
11.  Id. at 273.  
12.  Id. at 273, 298. 
13.  See id. at 271-72. 
14.  Id. at 285.  
15.  Mayer, supra note 1, at 286 (citing WORLD BANK, REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE 
WORLD BANK’S SAFEGUARD POLICIES 21 (2016), https://perma.cc/3JYC-U7H6).   
16.  Id. at 288. 
17.  Mayer, supra note 1, at 289, 290; Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1. 






specifically mentions EA as a tool for climate change mitigation.  
Additionally, the Minsk Declaration by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for European States outlined a shared vision to develop 
national climate change action and incorporate specific mitigation and 
adaptation measures into regional policies.19  Lastly, states could interpret 
CA in both the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.20  Both treaties require EAs, and 
Mayer argues that since climate change will impact both the oceans and 
biodiversity so severely, knowledge of GHG impacts is vital to meet these 
conventions’ protections.21  These obligations do not definitively find a CA 
requirement in international law, but they all point to a general obligation 
forming within the international community.   
C. INITIAL COMPLICATIONS OF A CLIMATE ASSESSMENT NORM 
One initial concern is who receives the duty of CA.  For EAs, the duty 
is due to the states potentially affected, but climate impacts are global.22  It 
is unreasonable to require global notification and the duty to assess impacts 
held to all other states.  Scholars have also brought up how to 
measure GHG impacts because every project could have a substantial 
impact and no significant impact based on the scale of 
assessment.23  Nevertheless, neither of these critiques eliminates the CA 
potential because CA is not a results-driven commitment but a method-
driven commitment.24  Mayer argues that the idea is that states agree to 
work in good faith based on the norm of common but differentiated 
responsibilities to reduce emissions based on the climate agreements 
discussed above.25  Therefore, CA could be accomplished by not looking at 
a project’s global GHG contributions but instead at the total GHGs of both 
the proposed project and the alternatives to find a reasonable GHG level 
for the type of project and whether the proposed project is significantly 
higher than alternatives. 26 This process would work to find the most 
efficient forms of projects over time.  By viewing CAs this way, it 
illustrates the potential for CA growth into an international customary 
norm, and public participation in EA can expand this norm because GHGs 
are arguably the most pressing environmental issue, and public 
participation would demand action to further prevent or lessen climate 
 
19.  Mayer, supra note 1, at 291.  
20.  Id.  
21.  Id.  
22.  Id. at 292 (citing N. Craik, Principle 17, in THE RIO DECLARATION ON 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMMENTARY 451, 458 (J.E. Viñuales ed., 2015)).   
23.  Id. at 293–294.  
24.  Id.  
25.  Mayer, supra note 1,at 301.  
26.  Jacqueline Peel, Environmental Impact Assessment and Climate Change, in 






impacts.  However, this assumes a meaningful public participation process, 
and the case studies demonstrate that not all developing states have 
achieved or strive for meaningful participation.   
CASE STUDIES ON ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS 
EVOLVING INTO CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS  
In compiling case studies to examine a potentially budding CA norm, 
a stark contrast between developed and developing states became apparent.  
While many developed nations are beginning to institute CAs in some form 
within their EA requirements, many developing nations are instead hoping 
to embrace climate adaption strategies that will grow their economies and 
potentially expand GHGs but with an eye towards long-term carbon-
neutrality.  First, this section discusses the United States EA and CA 
requirements and then discusses California’s CA requirements.  Second, 
this section discusses Ethiopia’s EA and its plans to leapfrog to green 
technology.  Third, South Korea will provide a brief insight into a recently 
developed nation’s actions.  Finally, Fiji will complete the case studies by 
examining its past struggles with environmental standards and its current 
adaptation plans.   
A. THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ACT AND GHG REQUIREMENTS 
As discussed above, the United States has an EA requirement but does 
not have a complete CA developed.  This section will discuss the EA’s legal 
requirements, and the successful public participation element.  Lastly, this 
section will discuss California’s successful CA requirements.   
i. United States Historical Goals and Legal Requirements 
NEPA protects the environment by requiring government decision-
makers to know a project’s full impacts before issuing approval.  Congress 
enacted NEPA to promote the general welfare and create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature could exist in productive harmony 
for present and future generations.27  The heart of NEPA requires every 
major federal action that significantly affects the quality of the human 
environment to create a detailed statement on its environmental impacts.28  
NEPA creates procedural requirements for agencies to complete an EA 
analysis if a project may significantly impact the environment.29   
 
27.  Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy Act §101, 42 
U.S.C. § 4331 (1969).   
28.  U.S.C. 4332(C).   






ii. Public Participation Under the U.S. NEPA Process 
The public can participate in this process both through litigation and 
the notice and comment process.  Agencies must respond to every comment 
received by the public in the final rulemaking and provide a concise 
statement of its basis and purpose.30  As long as the agency has received 
comments on an issue, the public has exhausted their administrative options 
and can litigate the issue if the public believes that the agency did not follow 
proper procedures or has substantive issues with the project.  This process 
gives the public both judicial and administrative ways to participate in 
governmental decision-making that impacts the environment.  
The current U.S. GHG regulations take a step backward for the U.S. 
but suggest discussing GHG impacts within the EA analysis.  NEPA 
requires the rule of reason for determining significant impacts.31  The 
guidance discusses that although agencies should not consider GHG 
impacts above other impacts, GHG impacts are still a part of the calculus 
if, in the agency’s experience and expertise, it determines that the project’s 
GHG emissions could cause significant impacts.32  Additionally, the 
guidance discusses how agencies can use indirect and cumulative GHG 
emissions to review climate change impacts as long as there is a sufficiently 
close causal relationship.33  However, if an agency believes the 
quantification of GHGs would be overly speculative, the agency can omit 
the discussion and explain its decision.34  This assessment gives agencies 
several ways to discount GHG impacts but shows that there are times when 
an agency must analyze GHG impacts under NEPA.  Thus, the U.S. is 
starting to require GHG impact assessments and indicates a potential future 
climate assessment norm. The previous U.S. administration cut back on this 
progress, but the new Biden administration seems likely to reverse this 
course.35  Additionally, state progress discussed below further solidifies the 
United States’ intention to move towards CAs despite the national volte-
face.   
 
30.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1946). 
31.  Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30097, 30097-98 (June 26, 2019). 
32.  Id.  
33.   Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 43331 (July 16, 2020). 
34.  Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 43331 (July 16, 2020). 
35.  Juliet Elprin, Brady Dennis, and John Muyskens, Tracking Biden’s 
Environmental Action, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2021); see also Kelsey Burger, Biden 






iii. California’s Increased CA Requirements Under Its NEPA Equivalent 
 The United States allows its states to enact their own NEPA 
equivalents with GHG requirements.  California takes NEPA a step farther 
than most, requiring an EA with a GHG assessment for all state agency 
actions and requiring mitigation of environmental impacts when feasible.36 
California achieves its high standard through several state statutes to ensure 
analysis and consideration of GHG impacts before project approval.  In 
2006, the California Legislature enacted the California Global Warming 
Solutions Act to reduce GHGs in California to 1990 levels by 2020 and 
require GHG reductions that are real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, 
enforceable, and additional to other legally required GHG reductions.37  In 
2008, the Legislature enacted the Sustainable Communities and Climate 
Protection Act to require counties to plan land use and transportation 
systems to further assist in GHG emission reductions.38  The California 
Legislature also amended the Global Warming Solutions Act in 2016 to 
further require GHG reductions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030 and 80% 
reductions by 2050.39  Lastly, under the 2018 update to California’s NEPA 
equivalent, agencies must analyze the GHGs of proposed projects under the 
broader climate change context, not just concerning state or national 
emissions totals and whether there are plans to mitigate the cumulative 
effects.40  California has already reduced its emissions and plans to be 
carbon-neutral by 2045, highlighting its commitment to CA and GHG 
mitigation requirements.41  California is not alone in state CA requirements 
but provides a view of the possible requirements developed states could 
undertake within a CA norm.  
B. ETHIOPIA’S ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND CLIMATE 
RESILIENT GREEN ECONOMY 
Ethiopia does not have any CA requirements but has a detailed EA.42  
Despite legislative efforts and treaty commitments requiring sufficient 
EAs, the Ethiopian EA has a few flaws that severely limit its effectiveness.  
In understanding the EA flaws, a further CA requirement would not help 
 
36.  Cal. Pub. Res. § 21061 (2019).  
37.  Cal. Health & Safety § 38562 (2018); Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Research, CEQA and Climate Change Through California Environmental Quality Act 
Review 3 (June 19, 2008).  
38.  Cal. Pub. Res. §§ 21155, 21159 (2009).  
39.  Governor Brown and Alex Padilla, Governor Brown Establishes Most 
Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target in North America, EXECUTIVE ORDER B-30-
15 (Apr. 29, 2015). 
40.  Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15064.4 (2018). 
41.  Anne Mulkern, California Can be Climate-Neutral in 25 Years–With Drastic 
Action, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/A2AP-JPEY.  
42.  Gedifew Yigzaw, History of Implementation of Environmental Impact 






Ethiopia reach its goal of a middle-class economy based on a climate-
resilient model.  This section will discuss Ethiopia’s EA requirements and 
international commitments, Ethiopia’s climate change plans, and why CA 
would not help Ethiopia meet its goals.  
i. History of Ethiopia’s EA Requirements 
Ethiopia’s EA requirements started to form in the 1980s with specific 
water resource developments that the United Nations and the World Health 
Organization developed.43  Additional donor-funded irrigation projects 
expanded the use of EAs in Ethiopia.44  Nevertheless, it was not until 2002 
that the formal process began with the Ethiopian Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) enacting the Environmental Impact Analysis 
Proclamation.45  The Proclamation requires any major planned 
development project or public policy that is likely to harm the environment 
to conduct an EA.46  The government requires that the project proponent 
ensure it meets all requirements before having the relevant environmental 
body approve the project.47  The environmental body may require 
additional obligations before the proponent is allowed to begin the 
project.48  The EPA also compiles guidelines and directives for whether a 
type of project requires an EA.49  Ethiopia’s EA requires public 
participation in providing access to the environmental studies and the 
required inclusion of public comments, particularly from the affected 
communities.50  
Ethiopia is a signatory to the United Nations Rio Declaration, the 
African Convention, and includes EA principles within its Constitution.51  
All of these international conventions implicitly require member states to 
institutionalize EA principles within their state.52  The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia’s Constitution section on Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms states explicitly that Constitutional interpretation should 
conform in a manner that includes all internationally agreed upon 
instruments adopted by Ethiopia.53  This interpretation requirement shows 
that these Conventions and Declarations frame the debate within Ethiopia 
 
43.  Yigzaw, supra note 42, at 82.   
44.  Id. at 83.  
45.  Id.  
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id.  
49.  Id. at 84.  
50.  Id. at 83, 85.  
51.  D.G. Gidey, The Role of Public Participation in Environmental Impact 
Assessments in Ethiopia: Theory and Practice, TILBERG U. 235, 250–252 (2017). 
52.  Id.  






by providing a guide for how the government is to implement its 
environmental laws.  
ii.  Regulatory and Judicial Hindrances to Meaningful Public 
Participation 
 Ethiopia’s EA requirements fail to provide accountability for project 
impacts because the EA structure does not support meaningful public 
participation and oversight.  First, there are no explicit requirements for 
public participation, except that proponents must attempt some form of 
participation.54  Project proponents usually complete this obligation via 
surveys or town halls.55  This allowance permits project proponents to avoid 
meaningful public participation by not allowing participation until the 
project is too far along or so early it avoids meaningful knowledge of the 
issues.56  This lessens the value of the EA requirement.  Also, governmental 
agencies must determine if project proponents have completed a sufficient 
EA but only have fifteen working days from submission to complete their 
findings and make a recommendation.57  These institutional challenges 
highlight that Ethiopia does not place a high value on the EA information 
because project proponents can easily manipulate or avoid meaningful EA 
oversight and participation.  
In reviewing the administrative processes, a similar issue arises under 
Ethiopians’ ability to appeal a governmental decision.  In Radical Academy, 
a school filed a grievance with the Ethiopian EPA and the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry regarding a large hospital construction project 
adjacent to the school that did not complete the required EA.58  The EPA 
responded by telling the construction company that when the construction 
permit was issued, the EPA advised against building a hospital near the 
school because of the environmental impacts each would cause on the 
other.59  However, the EPA did not include an administrative order to stop 
construction; instead, the EPA disclaimed responsibility for any 
environmental problems that may arise.60  This avoidance of responsibility 
implicitly endorses continued construction and the continued abrogation of 
future EAs.  
 The judicial system has also proved unhelpful in seeking enforcement 
of EA procedures.  Ethiopia does not follow the common law tradition 
where courts have judicial review powers; instead, the Ethiopian Supreme 
 
54.  Yigsaw, supra note 42, at 83. 
55.  Gidey, supra note 51, at 383, 390, 397.   
56.  Id. at 85.  
57.  Id.  
58.  Id. at 269. 
59.  Id.  






Court has invalidated lower court appeals claiming such power.61  In 
Privatization and Public Enterprises Supervising Agency v. Heirs of Nur 
Beza Terega, the Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court stated that 
ordinary courts in Ethiopia have no inherent judicial power to review the 
decisions of administrative bodies because, per the Supreme Court, judicial 
power emanates from statute.62  This holding shows that the public has little 
recourse from the courts because unless a statute explicitly allows appeals, 
the Supreme Court will not uphold a lower court review of agency action.  
 The lack of meaningful public participation and meaningful judicial 
recourse shows that Ethiopia’s EA requirements – although appearing 
strong on their face – have not acquired a meaningful status.  Ethiopia’s 
most significant issue is its top-down approach.63  The higher government 
bodies enact far-reaching environmental standards but do not provide 
enough enforcement and guidance to ensure success from the bottom up.64  
This case study shows that even when an international standard becomes a 
norm, that does not ensure successful implementation even if states have 
adopted the norm into their government and legal structures. 
iii. Ethiopia’s Self-Imposed Climate and GHG Commitments 
 There are few CA concerns in Ethiopia because of the state’s low 
GHG emissions.  Ethiopia is a developing nation and voluntarily declared 
that it would limit its GHGs to one hundred and forty-five megatons of 
carbon dioxide under the Paris Agreement; this would be two-hundred and 
forty-four percent above Ethiopia’s 1990 levels.65  Additionally, Ethiopia 
has a long-term goal of becoming carbon neutral.66  Ethiopia’s plan is the 
Climate-Resilient Green Economy (CRGE), where it hopes to achieve a 
middle-income lifestyle for its citizens while not increasing its GHGs from 
2010 levels.  Ethiopia plans to accomplish this through four pillars:  
1. Improving crop and livestock practices for higher food security   
and farmer income while reducing emissions,  
2.  Protecting and re-establishing forests for their economic and 
carbon stocks, 
3. Expanding renewable sources of energy for domestic and regional 
markets, and  
 
61. Gidey, supra note 51, at 270–271. 
62.  Id. at 271.    
63.  Id. at 398, 405.  
64.  Id. 
65.  Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green 
Economy: National Adaptation Plan (May 2019), https://perma.cc/835R-QQBV; Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy: Green 
Economy Strategy 2, 11 (Nov. 2011), https://perma.cc/HW94-S8D3.  
66.  Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy: Green Economy Strategy, supra 






4. Leapfrogging to modern and energy-efficient technologies in 
transport, industrial sectors, and buildings.67 
Ethiopia was supposed to release its update on the CRGE in 2020, but 
it was delayed, presumably due to both the COVID-19 pandemic and a 
potential civil war.68  If the CRGE fails because of similar EA struggles, it 
would further demonstrate the impotence of a CA norm for Ethiopia 
because it would require more paperwork and fail to provide meaningful 
enforcement standards or raise living standards.  
However, presuming Ethiopia’s CRGE goal succeeds, this would 
avoid the standard GHG-focused model, grow its economy using green 
technology, and sell carbon stocks to help finance its ambitious goals.  
Ethiopia has planted three and a half million trees; the Ethio-Wetlands and 
Natural Resources Association is working on how to incorporate coffee-
growing onto forest floors to allow communities to profit from forests.69  
These actions motivate local communities to care for their forests instead 
of clear-cutting for raising exportable cattle.  Currently, fuelwood is one of 
the primary energy sources satisfying the energy needs of about ninety 
percent of Ethiopia’s rural households.70  CRGE plans to disseminate fuel-
efficient or alternative-fuel cookstoves to lessen forest destruction and 
combine this program with reforestation efforts, significantly decreasing 
Ethiopia’s GHG emissions and increasing its forest health.71  Ethiopia has 
also built its Grand Renaissance Dam, which it plans to use for hydropower 
to lessen its GHG needs further.72  Unfortunately, the dam has met with 
international objections as Egypt worries about Ethiopia damming Egypt’s 
only water source.73  Egypt has threatened war over the dam filling, and 
there have been no successful agreements on how to fill the dam.74  Sudan, 
 
67.  Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy: Green Economy Strategy, supra 
note 65, at 22. 
68.  Siobhan O’Grady, What’s Behind the Conflict in Ethiopia, WASHINGTON POST 
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/9VMS-MH8J. 
69.  Steve Zwick, How Ethiopia is Slowing Climate Change by Reviving its Forests 
– and its Economy, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Jan. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/5LBV-
GCD7;  University of Huddersfield, Preserving Coffee and Forests in Ethiopia for a 
Sustainable Future, PHYS.ORG (July 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q2GC-DZBT;  Eyder 
Peralta, Ethiopia Plants 350 Million Trees as Part of ‘Green Legacy’ Program, NPR (Jul. 
31, 2019), https://perma.cc/V9LR-FQGD. 
70. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green 
Economy: Green Economy Strategy, 103 (Nov. 2011) https://perma.cc/8UZP-PP7T.  
71.  Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, supra note 70, at 14.  
72.  Ruth Michaelson, It’ll Cause a Water War: Divisions Run Deep as Filing of 
Nile Dam Nears, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/B838-KX2F. 
73.  Id.  
74.  Aljazeera News, Sudan Rejects Ethiopia Proposal to Sign Nile Mega-Dam 






the other affected state, has also recently spoken out against Ethiopia filling 
the dam due to environmental and social concerns.75 
 The CRGE plan could be an example of how developing nations can 
grow economies, raise living standards through technological 
advancements, and improve carbon sequestration by rehabilitating their 
local environments through local customs.  Ethiopia has well-established 
EA requirements, yet with environmental oversight agencies abdicating 
responsibility and little meaningful public participation, it raises the 
question of whether the CRGE will be successful.  If the CRGE uses a top-
down approach and rare bottom-up enforcement or oversight, there could 
be comparable results to its failed EA process.  This top-down approach is 
a major concern in developing nations because it pushes the western 
standards of EA enactment without incorporating how local populations 
will participate in the process to allow publicly demanded mitigations to 
thrive.  However, tying the CRGE to economic growth and living standards 
increases political motivations to ensure CRGE’s chance of success.   
If Ethiopia enacts further CA requirements without first resolving the 
current EA faults, there would likely be similar failures.  A developing 
state’s politicians have no incentive to reduce their state GHGs when major 
social and economic problems need solving.  Once Ethiopia can improve 
its EA public participation and potentially alter its judicial appeal 
processes, Ethiopia could add a CA requirement. But as it stands, CA would 
be another empty procedural process until public knowledge of its potential 
pushes agencies to require more than project proponent suggest for fear of 
public outcry.   Conversely, the benefits of using traditional customs and 
values to build a green economy based on CRGE would promote a more 
environmentally conscious citizenry because the public would immediately 
see the benefits of green technology and higher standards of living in a 
locally recognizable way, and this would further CRGE expansion.  This 
issue demonstrates why CA is not the norm the international community 
should embrace.  A climate responsibility norm would welcome the CRGE 
process for developing nations because it allows for long-term reductions 
of GHGs, adaption to the impacts of climate change, all while meeting the 
needs of Ethiopians within their current customs and values.  
C. SOUTH KOREA ILLUSTRATES CA BENEFITS FOR RECENTLY 
DEVELOPED NATIONS 
In contrast to Ethiopia, South Korea (Korea) has recently enacted CA 
requirements.  Korea EA requirements began as prior consultations in 1977 
under the Environmental Conservation Act, becoming formal EAs in some 
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sectors in 1981 under the Framework Act on Environmental Policy.76  In 
2009, the Korean Ministry of the Environment published the first GHG 
impact assessment guidelines to promote climate change awareness.77  CA 
is only a legal requirement if the environmental impact assessment scoping 
committee believes that the nature of the development, size, or strategic 
significance warrants CA requirements.78  In reviewing the year 2010, after 
this CA requirement became official, twenty-six projects conducted EAs, 
with eight of these projects including a CA analysis.79  
In comparing the United States, South Korea, and Ethiopia, it shows 
CA as a natural extension since the U.S. requirements are more established 
and have ample public participation and enforcement and some concrete 
CA requirements.  Ethiopia does not require CA but has only recently 
begun EA requirements and still has some faults to work through.  Korea 
falls in the middle of the spectrum.  However, CA is an urgent matter that 
is only becoming a norm because of the imminent climate impacts that have 
started occurring.  Korea does not face the developing nation concerns that 
Ethiopia faces; additionally, Korea heavily emits GHGs primarily through 
coal energy production while Ethiopia emits very few GHGs.80  Korea has 
said it is committed to not approving new coal power plants, but there 
appear to be some loopholes in this commitment, and many plants are 
relatively new.81  
 If Korea follows the budding CA norm and requires CA for any new 
coal plants, as the scoping committee can require, this would be more 
desirable than not requiring any GHG actions.  However, since Korea has 
significant GHG emissions, a better outcome would be to alter the state 
energy sources to renewables over coal.  A CA could require renewables 
for new projects as an alternative and promote GHG mitigation similar to 
California’s requirements.  However, Ethiopia shows that not all states have 
robust public participation to ensure environmental protection through 
government reporting and analysis.  By embracing a climate responsibility 
norm, states would take ownership of how their people interact with their 
government and use this process to create robust GHG emission reductions 
instead of a procedural reporting requirement of GHG emissions without 
ensuring substantive reduction efforts.  For Korea, lowering GHG 
emissions would improve air quality, so a coal plant could include 
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renewables as an EA alternative to enhance air quality without considering 
CA.82  Korea instituting a CA will bring benefits, but Korea has already 
established an EA system for CA to follow.83  When states lack these 
established standards, it lessens the chance of CA successfully reducing 
GHGs.  Climate change abatements do not have time to stumble because of 
differing national values. 
D. FIJI, MOVING TOWARDS ADAPTION WITH CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 
Fiji is a developing nation that has embraced the CA and adaption 
mentality.  Nevertheless, there are challenges, particularly when examining 
Fiji’s environmental protection efforts.  Historically, a lack of respect for 
traditional Fijian values has been the primary cause of Fiji’s environmental 
failures.84  Fiji faces tension in its intermingling of indigenous rights and 
national agency oversight, leaving indigenous people to fear the new 
government will abrogate their rights through competing interests and 
overlapping duties by state agencies.85  A significant reason for this conflict 
is the tension between the western value systems and the Fijian historical 
hierarchy and governance.86  First, this section will discuss Fijian EA and 
CA history and the international obligations relating to climate change 
impacts.  Then, it will review land control policies and Fiji’s environmental 
protection flaws.  Last, it will discuss Fiji’s adaption and current CA plans 
and future barriers to success.  
i. Fijian EA Requirements and International Obligations 
Currently, Fiji requires an EA for all major projects and some smaller 
projects within the coastal zone or thirty meters of a river or stream.87  The 
Fijian EA authority must examine a development proposal and determine 
if a significant environmental or natural resource impact is likely to occur.88  
The EA requires both assessment and feasible mitigation measures and may 
require public participation during the initial EA review.89 Additionally, the 
public can view the EA within twenty-one days of submission to the 
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environmental authority.90  If the public disagrees with the authority’s 
decision, the public can appeal the decision within twenty-one days from 
the date of the decision to the Environmental Tribunal.91  However, this 
tribunal has only heard three cases, and there is little public information 
about its members, procedures, or decisions.92  
Fiji has only had continuous democratic control for the past six 
years.93  Previously Fijian governance included chieftains, a British colony, 
and dominion by two different militaries and one civilian coup until 2014.94  
Despite these domestic struggles, Fiji has instituted environmental 
assessments, including a GHG impact assessment.  Fiji has become a leader 
in international climate change governance, being the first nation to ratify 
the Paris Accords.95  Fiji is  a signatory to the United Nations Convention 
on Climate Change, the Montreal Protocol, and the Stockholm 
Convention.96  Additionally, Fiji is a signatory to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.97  Through all of these conventions, agreements, and legislation, Fiji 
is working towards becoming carbon-neutral by 2050 and has a climate 
adaption strategy that includes a framework for climate migrations if sea-
level rise requires Fijian communities to move.98  
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Fiji’s national environmental protections follow a top-down 
approach that historically ignored bottom-up social and community needs 
and faced struggles similar to Ethiopia.  The Fijian Native Lands Trust 
Board focused on allowing indigenous people to retain control and 
receive compensation through tenure arrangements for the resources 
locals lost to environmental conservation or development.99   The Fijian 
national government and international organizations pushed EA practices, 
despite Fiji’s struggles to fund hospitals, schools, or roads.100  When the 
national government promoted environmental protections while Fijians 
struggled for basic necessities, it created a culture of local acquiesce to 
environmental protections for profit, not genuine desire for the EA 
practices that western funding valued.  Yet, the external westernized 
organizations frequently blame environmental enforcement struggles on a 
lack of education, technical deficiencies, or “institutional difficulties of an 
immature state.”101  These “immature state” arguments assume that 
western environmental management views are paramount and discount 
the tension between Fijian’s basic necessity concerns and traditional 
environmental practices. 
ii. Local Control in Conflict with National Objectives 
 The local chieftain rule has come into conflict with national laws and 
power structures.  At the same time, socio-economic controls protect the 
rights of indigenous populations and leave in place their hierarchical 
customs.  As the prior case studies have highlighted, public participation is 
required to ensure EA success.  Unfortunately, Fiji has a history of 
restricting or discouraging public participation so that the historical elite 
remain in control.102  The financial gains occur because the Native Lands 
Trust Board receives a proportion of any funds the Board distributes to 
indigenous populations for the use of their lands.103  The indigenous chiefs 
distribute the remaining funds to the indigenous peoples as they deem 
appropriate.104  These indigenous financial gains are not from a lack of 
environmental concern but a fundamental question of who controls the 
resources.   
Fiji has long relied on customary governance systems and a council 
of chiefs for environmental protection practices, but the national laws have 
conflicted.  The national government relies on the local community to 
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manage fisheries but does not grant the locals authority.  This conflicting 
agenda forces the local chiefs to rely solely on historical customary 
enforcement.105  The indigenous population generally respects the 
customary authority, but as financial gains from illegal fishing grow, the 
lack of legally actionable authority significantly diminishes enforcement.106  
The paramount Chief in Mancuta Province seized a boat that was illegally 
fishing to enforce national laws and local customs.107  The national 
government arrested the Chief for larceny because he lacked the authority 
to seize property.108  Ultimately, the government dropped the charges 
against him.  However, it had a chilling effect on community enforcement 
and highlighted the need to ensure that local enforcement has proper 
authority under national laws.109  
Initially, indigenous chiefs were the defining authority, and 
subsistence fishing was the local custom.  However, when western 
governance began, there were efforts to promote artisanal fishing over 
subsistence fishing, leading indigenous populations to become accustomed 
to fishing to support themselves through sales instead of subsistence.110  
These governmental promotions included providing outboard motorboats 
and equipment, with the same government later regulating and banning said 
equipment when environmental protection ideals arose.111 Additionally, 
intermediaries have moved into some villages to help fishermen sell their 
fish in nearby cities, allowing easy access to illegal fishing profits.112   In 
altering the indigenous chief customary norms’ processes, it devalued the 
Chief’s role in environmental protection, yet the national government later 
desired such actions.  This hierarchical void left the indigenous community 
knowing that communal norms lack power and that the national 
enforcement only occurs at the community level.   
By instituting national measures within local community customary 
power frameworks and supporting local power at the national level, the 
most successful implementation of environmental laws can occur.  When 
the village of Tui Kubulau allowed traditional chiefs to administer the 
national fishing licenses for non-subsistence fishing and matched protected 
zones with local needs, it transformed the current system to meet national 
standards through locally acceptable customs.113  In a different instance, the 
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fishermen discovered that legal protections did not extend to protected 
areas at the national level, leading the fishermen to lose respect for the local 
customs and protest the nationally mandated local protected zones.114  
Taking national ideals and shaping them to fit local practices with national 
legal mechanisms places a support structure for proper enforcement.  
Historically, Fiji’s national government has discounted traditional 
practices, brought in western legal standards, and required locals to enforce 
these new laws as the national government desired.115  EA and CA call for 
public participation and oversight, which does not align with Fiji’s 
traditional customs.  If the public does not participate, EAs fail because EA 
requires the public to demand their government officials act.  Without this 
participation, EAs lose their power and become an empty and costly 
procedural action.  
iii. Fijian Climate Policies and Adaption Plans 
These Fijian enforcement struggles have lessened the indigenous 
power structures for more western power dynamics from the national 
government.  Thus, Fiji is losing its traditional environmental practices and 
governance but gaining EAs in the process.  In some ways, the current 
Fijian climate adaption policy has benefited from this loss because it seeks 
to embrace many western norms with a top-down national approach that 
focuses on public participation that is now growing in Fijian acceptance 
because of past struggles.  The vertical integration section of the Fijian 
National Adaptation Plan works to incorporate diverse social groups in a 
participatory approach to decision making, with a particular focus on 
gender differences in adaption needs and equitable access to financial 
resources.116  Nevertheless, these ideals are vastly different from the Native 
Lands Resource Trust Board based on the male lineage chieftains.  The 
reports so far do not discuss how these top-down approaches will ensure 
integration with the local customs.  However, the reports are not about the 
bottom-up approaches.  The National Adaption Plan could embrace the 
climate responsibility norm by focusing its efforts on access to financial 
resources and similar goals that could incorporate local values and customs.  
However, the current version’s success will highlight if Fiji has embraced 
the western public participation process  or if it requires more historical 
considerations in its implementation and enforcement to achieve success.  
Unfortunately, the National Adaptation plan focuses heavily on 
education and knowledge of climate issues and adaptation necessities, such 
as water conservation and best farming practices.117  Only one adaption 
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action addresses strengthening community-based fisheries management, 
while many focus on increasing knowledge and data to allow for more 
informed future decision making.118  These statements start to point to the 
claim that Fiji’s environmental struggles are due to their “immature state” 
status.  In reality, Fijian historical governmental customs and knowledge is 
structured differently than western nations, and this difference is not about 
a lack of community knowledge of environmental needs.  Instead of 
discrediting local knowledge, the National Adaption Plan needs to 
recognize its national value to achieve more permanent success.  One 
example is when the Kubulau district Council of Chiefs successfully 
instituted protected zones and fishery rotations based on traditional customs 
and values prior to any national protections; this action protected the 
district’s environment while respecting the culture through governance the 
population understood.119 
The National Adaptation Plan approach has similarities to Ethiopia, 
where it hopes to move toward climate resilience and includes adaption 
measures, such as potential climate migrations for the island 
communities.120  Whether this plan will be successful or repeat previous 
legal structures that lacked community support and participation will 
depend on its implementation.  In April 2020, Fiji released its report on its 
plan for monitoring and enforcement.121  It focused on collecting data, 
public participation, access to information, and using the data to shape 
future adaption policy.122 Once the report on the National Adaptation Plan 
review is complete, it will provide a better picture of Fiji’s success.  But 
since Fiji has embraced numerous democratic politics, there is a chance the 
local customs are migrating towards participation and oversight.  When the 
fishermen protested customary norms because of their lack of national 
enforcement, it demonstrated that Fijians are not against speaking up for 
their rights and a desire for public participation.  Successful EA and CA 
policies require this kind of public outcry and national government 
structures to hear people’s voices, which the National Adaptation Plan is 
hoping to provide.  
Ultimately, Fiji’s success in its Adaption Plan will depend on whether 
the local citizenry has genuinely embraced the robust public participation 
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values of westernized states.  If the Fijians do not actively participate in the 
environmental processes, it will lead to the continued failures not because 
Fiji is an “immature state” but because Fiji does not have the same values 
as the western states that created the EA process.  In seeking to expand 
towards a CA norm, Fiji must first figure out how to successfully use the 
EA process.  Conversely, a climate responsibility norm would allow Fiji to 
tailor its GHG emission control to the local customs to achieve success 
without the additional procedural hurdles that do not provide practical 
benefits to the Fijians.  
SHOULD A BUDDING CLIMATE ASSESSMENT NORM 
TAKE HOLD? 
A CA norm is spreading, with the European Union, United States, 
Fiji, Western Australia, and Canada enacting some form of CA, among 
others.123  However, there is yet to be a clear consensus on implementing 
this requirement between states, mainly the conflicts arise in where the 
significance threshold lies for GHG impacts, mitigation requirements, and 
consistency.124  There needs to be further discussion on whether an 
international CA norm should require significant standards and mitigation 
requirements, substantially reducing climate impacts.  However, these 
increased requirements would push back the potential implementation of a 
CA norm because it would further push against state sovereignty, which 
has been the international CA’s biggest hurdle.  
The case studies highlight the struggles developing nations have faced 
in protecting the environment under EA standards.  CA will not fulfill its 
goal of lessening climate impacts enough under the time constraints of 
impending climate catastrophes if developing states must fulfill costly 
empty requirements.  The international community should instead seek to 
establish the norm of climate responsibility.  Basing this norm on the norm 
of common but differentiated responsibilities would allow the developed 
states to continue their GHG monitoring while pushing these states to 
embrace their responsibilities to protect the planet from the devastation they 
have primarily caused.  More importantly, climate responsibility would 
also allow developing nations flexibility to maintain their cultural and 
indigenous knowledge and power structures while seeking economic 
growth and climate adaptions that avoid GHG emissions as much as 
possible.  Indigenous knowledge is not static, backward thinking, but 
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locally specific knowledge based on centuries of use and adapted to local 
culture and environments.125  Developing nations have many pressing 
issues that need addressing, and climate responsibility would allow 
developing states to own their climate responsibility within their cultural 
values and capabilities.  Ethiopia and Fiji’s GHG contributions are nothing 
compared to developed nations, and a CA requirement only takes resources 
away from more practical solutions and government support programs.126  
By embracing climate responsibility, states embrace a post-development 
mindset and work to incorporate indigenous knowledge and customs with 
more modern practices to find the best way forward and avoid conflicts 
between local and national governments.127 
 Ethiopia’s CRGE is a fitting example of a developing state not doing 
CA but still avoiding GHG developments by seeking international funding 
for renewable projects to help Ethiopia raise its living standard to a middle-
class economy.  Although filled with other environmental consequences 
and political turmoil, building a dam is likely an excellent idea to support 
Ethiopia’s energy needs without GHG consumption while providing a more 
reliable water source for Ethiopia.  The dam has caused unrest, and Ethiopia 
is also currently struggling to fend off a civil war.  Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s 
struggles highlight the need for developed countries to financially pay for 
the GHG pollution they created, not based on charity but based on 
responsibility.  However, the idea of state sovereignty reigns high in 
international negotiations, and there is little incentive to agree to pay for 
something without a tangible benefit to developed states.  By working 
towards a norm of climate responsibility, it solidifies and expands the 
common but differentiated responsibilities norm and its relation to climate 
change because it allows each state to work together while resolving GHG 
impacts within their domestic norms and traditions.  
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The climate assessment norm, argued by Mayer, is likely growing in 
international acceptance from the domestic efforts to include climate 
assessments in EA practices.  However, this norm pushes the western 
mindset onto non-westernized nations.  By embracing climate 
responsibility, all nations can meet their GHG reduction targets and 
succeed on their terms.  Further research is necessary into other states’ 
climate adaption efforts and successes that value indigenous customs.  A 
growing CA norm is not a negative.  Developed nations are the main 
contributors to GHG pollution and climate impacts.  If all of these nations 
seriously considered and established CA, preferably with significant 
mitigation requirements for their GHG emissions, GHGs would 
significantly lessen and, with this, the climate impacts that all nations face. 
Nevertheless, if there are budding international norms, these norms 
should take a flexible approach to compliance so that all nations can benefit 
from their implementation.  Ethiopia and Fiji have not shown many benefits 
from EA procedures because this norm does not consider their governance 
structures or cultural practices, leaving significant gaps in enforcement.  
Thus, the EA has avoided the environmental protections it is supposed to 
foster.  A climate norm must do better if the international community 
desires the significant abatement of climate impacts that our planet 
desperately needs.   
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